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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of two separate, but related, non-judicial foreclosure sales. 
Petitioner, Larry Spencer ("Spencer"), defaulted on two separate promissory notes and the two 
underlying deeds of trust. Respondent, Davidson Trust Company, Custodian for IWSEP 
Account No. 68-081 1-30 ("Davidson Trust"), was the beneficiary under both deeds of trust. The 
Successor Tmtee, James Rawn, initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings pursuant to both 
deeds of trust. Davidson Trust was the high bidder at both non-judicial foreclosure sales and was 
given Trustee Deeds to the underlying real property. 
Spencer filed the present action claiming "irregularities" in both non-judicial foreclosure 
sales. Spencer sought a declaratory judgment to set aside and reschedule the sales and monetary 
damages in the form of an alleged surplus of funds from the two sales. Respondent Dee Jameson 
("Jameson") has been named individually and his only association to this case is that he is a 
beneficiary of the IRAISEP account held by Davidson Trust. The Successor Trustee, James 
Raeon, is named as a Defendant but has never appeared in the action. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDLNGS BELOW 
Spencer filed the underlying Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages on April 
27,2006. (Clerk's Record on Appeal "R.", p. 1). 
Spencer filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages on the 
same date. (R., p. 26). 
Counsel for Jameson filed a Notice of Appearance on May 17,2006. (R., p. 39). 
Counsel for Davidson Trust filed a Notice of Appearance on May 18,2006. (R. p. 41). 
Jameson filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint and Affirmative Defenses on June 
20,2006. (fL, p. 43). 
Jameson submitted discovery, including Request for Admissions, to Spencer on July 26, 
2006. (Clerk's Augmented Record on Appeal "AR.", p. 41). 
Spencer responded to the Request for Admissions on August 29,2006. (AR., p. 41). 
Jameson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment along with a Memorandum and 
supporting Affidavits on November 3,2006. (AR., pp. 15,17,28, & 32). 
On January 16, 2007, Spencer filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Jameson's Motion 
for Summary Judgment along with supporting Affidavits. (AR., pp. 52,75 & 94). 
Jameson filed a Reply to Spencer's Memorandum in Opposition to Jameson's Motion for 
Surnmary Judgment on January 23,2007. (AIL, p. 98). 
On January 26, 2007, Davidson Trust filed a joinder in Jameson's Motion for S m a r y  
Judgment. (R., p. 55). 
The District Court heard oral arguments on January 29,2007. (Tr. P. 4, Ln. 18). 
On March 1,2007, Davidson Trust filed an Answer to Amended Complaint. (R., p. 64). 
On March 6,2007, the District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 
Jameson's Motion for Summary Judgment as it applies to all defendants. @, p. 72). 
On March 20,2007, Spencer filed a Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration. (AR., 
p. 117). 
Jameson and Davidson Trust each filed a Response to Spencer's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Clarification. (AR., pp. 139 & 148). 
The District Court heard oral arguments on Spencer's Motion for 
ReconsiderationlClarification on May 22,2007. (Tr. P. 3, Ln. 4-7). 
At the hearing, the District Court requested additional factual statements and legal 
authority from the parties before rendering its opinion. (Tr. P. 25, Ln. 8-15 and Tr. P. 26, Ln. 14- 
The parties submitted the requested briefing on or before May 29,2007. (a, pp. 151, 
On July 25,2007, the District Court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order denying 
Spencer's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification. (R., p. 82). 
Spencer filed the present appeal on August 17,2007. (R., p. 90). 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about April 30, 2002, Spencer executed a promissory note in favor of Davidson 
Trust agreeing to repay the amount of $90,000.00. (AR., p. 32). 
2. The obligation under this promissory note was secured by a deed of trust for the 
following described parcels of real property in Kootenai County, Idaho: 
PARCEL 1 : 
Lot 1, Block 1, BIG TIMBER, according to the plat recorded in Book "G" of Plats at 
Page 457, records of Kootenai County, Idaho. 
PARCEL 2: 
Lot 2, Block 1, BIG TIMBER, according to the plat recorded in Book "G" of Plats at 
Page 457, records of Kootenai County, Idaho. 
PARCEL 3: 
The South half of the Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter 
of Section 7, Township 52, North, Range 3 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, 
Idaho, less U.S. Highway 95. Formerly known as Block 11, Spokane Valley Commercial 
Orchard Tracts. 
Together with 1981 Skyline Mobile Home, 24x56, Vim #01910302P 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Real Property") (This entire transaction is hereinafter 
referred to as the "First Deed of Trust"). (AR., pp. 32-33). 
3. On November 14,2002, Spencer executed a second promissory note in favor of Davidson 
Trust agreeing to repay the additional loaned amount of $65,000.00. (m, p. 33). 
4. The obligation under the second note was secured by a deed of trust only on Parcel 3, 
above. (This entire transaction is hereinafter referred to as the "Second Deed of Trust") (AR., p. 
33). 
5. In relation to the Second Deed of Tmt, Spencer and Davidson Trust entered into a "Loan 
Commitment Agreement" whereby Spencer agreed to make several enumerated improvements to 
the Real Property and funds would be released to him upon completion of each item. (AR., pp. 
34 & 36-38). 
6. Michael Thompson, an unrelated third person and not a party to the present action, 
subordinated his lien on the Real Property to both the First Deed of Trust and the Second Deed 
of Trust. (AR, pp. 135-138). 
7. Spencer defaulted on his repayment obligation under both the First Deed of Trust and 
Second Deed of T m t  and non-judicial foreclosure proceedings were initiated by the Successor 
Trustee, James Raeon. (AR., pp. 29 & 46). 
8. On February 24, 2005, two separate non-judicial foreclosure sales were held at the 
Successor Trustee's office. (AR., p. 29). 
9. The sales were conducted in reverse chronological order. The sale under the Second 
Deed of Trust was conducted at 10:OO a.m. (AR., p. 29). 
10. Spencer did qL?T attend this sale. (AR., p. 29). 
1 1 .  As of February 24,2005, the total obligation owed by Spncer  --lvsuant the Second 
Deed of Trust, inclusive of all costs, interest and fees, was $86,507.45. (-, P- 87)' 
12. Davidson Trust submitted a credit bid in the amount of $86 ,507 .45  - (AR., pp. 29 & 87)- 
13. Davidson Trust's bid at the Second Deed of Trust sale was the= bighest "d Davidson 
Trust was given a Trustee's Deed to parcel 3. (AR., p. 29). 
14. The sale under the First Deed of Trust was conducted at 10:30 a n  - (AR, P. 29)- 
15. Spencer &d attend this sale. (AR., p. 29). 
16. As of Feb- 24,2005, the total obligation owed by Spencer p- -.l-suant the First Dee' 
of Trust, inclusive of all costs and fees, was $1 17,566.92. (a, p. 88). 
17. Davidson Trust submitted a credit bid in the amount of $ 2 0 4 , 0 7 4  - 37, which included tt 
amounts due under both the First Deed of Trust and Second Deed of T-- - (IAR+' pP' 29 & ")' 
18. Spencer bid $10.00 at the sale. (AR. p. 29). 
19. Davidson Trust's bid at the First Deed of Trust sale was tbe big--est and Davidson *I" 
was given a Trustee's Deed to the Red Property. (AR., pp. 29-30). 
20. The Trustee's Deeds for the First Deed of Trust safe and Second =eed of Tmst "Ie " 
recorded at I 1:29 a.m. and I 1:30 am. on February 24,2005. (R. pp. 18- 9; 20-22). 
If. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether Jameson is entitled to an award of attorney fee====-- On pUTSm 
Idaho Code Section 12-120,12-121& 12-123? 
ent in favor " B. Whether the District Court properly granted Summary 
Defendants? 
111. ATTORNEY HCES ON APPEAL 
The award of attorney fees is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is 
remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is whether the commercial transaction 
comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.C. 5 12-120(3) 
unless the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which 
the party is attempting to recover. Gunter v. Murohv's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 105 P.3 676 
(2005). 
In Tavlor v. Just, 138 Idaho 137, 59, P.3d 308 (2002), Taylor filed a lawsuit seeking a 
declaratory judgment and an order directing a trustee of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale to execute 
and deliver a trust deed to him as the highest bidder at the sale. Taylor was the prevailing party 
at the lower court level and was awarded attomey fees pursuant to 12-120(3). The Idaho 
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling, but in doing so, awarded the trustee its costs 
and attorney fees because it found that the non judicial foreclosure sale was a commercial 
transaction. The same result should apply in the present case. 
In addition, Idaho Code 3 12-121 provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailmg 
party. "Provided, attomey fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court 
only when it fmds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." IRCP 54(e)(I). "This determination rests in 
the sound discretion of the trial court. When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on 
appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower 
wurt correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within 
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702,99 P.3d 1092 (2004). 
Idaho Code 5 12-123 further provides for an award of attorney fees for frivolous conduct 
in civil actions. Frivolous conduct means filing a civil action that is not supported in fact or 
warranted undet existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law. LC. 4 12-123. 
From the outset, Dee Jameson has objected to being named in his individual capacity in 
this lawsuit. Mr. Jameson, individually, is not named in any of the numerous contracts, notes or 
deeds of trusts that make up the underlying wmmercial transaction. Mr. Jameson's only 
relationship to this case is that he is the beneficiary of the IRAISEP account. Neither of the w- 
defendants made concerted efforts to defend the claims. As such, Mr. Jameson took it upon 
himself to file an answer, discovery and the motion for summary judgment. Clearly a claim 
against Mr. Jameson, individually, is not supported by the facts or warranted under existing law 
and he requests an award of reasonable attorney fees in this regard. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in that party's favor as to all or any part thereof. Rule 56(b), Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The judgment sought shall be forthwith rendered if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material hct  and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 
56(c), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this Court uses the same standard 
employed by the trial court when deciding such a motion. 'If the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law' summary judgment is proper. The burden is on the moving party to prove an 
absence of genuine issues of material fact. In addition, this Court views the facts and 
inferences in the record in favor of the non-moving party. 
Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School District #84,142 Idaho 804,806, 134 P.3d 655,657 (2006) 
(Citations Omitted). 
B. Summary Judgment was Properly Granted in Favor of the Respondents. 
There are no genuine issues of material fact and Respondents are entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. Spencer filed the present action seeking two different remedies. First, 
Spencer asked the District Court to set aside the non-judicial foreclosure sales and reschedule 
them for another sale. In the alternative, Spencer asked the District Court to award him an 
alleged surplus of money arising out of the foreclosure sale bids. However, the record clearly 
shows that Spencer is not entitled to either relief. 
1. The Non-Judicial Foreclosure Sales Should Not Be Set Aside. 
Spencer alleges that there were "irregularities" and the District Court should have ordered 
that the foreclosure sales be rescheduled. I-Iowever, Spencer has offered no authority which 
would give the courts the power to reschedule the non-judicial foreclosure sales at issue. In fact, 
the Idaho statutes are quite clear: 
FINAJLITY OF SALE. A sale made by a trustee under this act shall foreclose and 
terminate all interest in the proverty covered by the trust deed of all persons to whom 
notice is given under section 45-1506, Idaho Code, and of any other person claiming by, 
through or under such persons and such persons shall have no right to redeem the 
proper& from the purchaser at the trustee's safe. The failure to give notice to any of such 
persons by mailing, personal sewice, posting or publication in accordance with section 
45-1506, Idaho Code, shall not affect the validity of the sale as to persons so notified nor 
as to any such persons having actual knowledpe of the sale. Furthermore, any failure to 
comply with the provisions of section 45-1506, Idaho Code, shall not affect the validity 
of a sale in favor of a purchaser in good faith for value at or after such sale, or any 
successor in interest thereof. 
LC. 3 45-1508 (Emphasis added). 
Spencer's Amended Complaint makes no allegations that he did not receive adequate 
notice of the foreclosure sales at issue in this case. (R., pp. 26-38). In fact, Spencer has admitted 
in discovery that he is not making any claims based upon the form, content or service of the 
notices of foreclosure sales in this case. 
"REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17: Please admit you received all notices of 
foreclosure sale to which you were entitled pursuant to Idaho law. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18: Please admit you are not making any 
allegations in the present action as to the form, content or service of any of the 
foreclosure notices issued by the Trustee in this case. 
RESPONSE: Admit." 
(AR, P. 47). 
Spencer's own admissions show that he received all notices of the non-judicial 
foreclosure sales at issue in the present case. Spencer did not appear at the first sale, but he did 
appear at the second sale. He was provided the opportunity to bid at the second sale and he only 
bid $10.00. He was outbid by Davidson Trust and his interest in the property has been 
terminated pursuant to the cleat language of Idaho law. 
In his Brief on Appeal, Spencer states "Davidson Trust argued it is a bona fide 
purchaser and the non-judicial sales are final." (Spencer's Brief on Appeal, p. 24). This 
statement is incorrect for several reasons. Fit, the Defendants have never argued they are bona 
fide purchasers. He is apparently referring to the last sentence in LC. $45-1508. but, the statute 
has three sentences with three separate and distinct meanings. The first sentence states that 
notice of the foreclosure sale effectively terminales all interests of that person after the sate is 
completed. The second sentence states that failure to give notice shall not affect the validity as 
to those who actually received notice. Spencer admits he received the notices of the foreclosure 
sales and even attended one of the sales. As such, the fust two sentences of LC. 5 45-1508 
effectively terminate his interest therein. The last sentence states that even if a person did not get 
notice of the sale, their interest is terminated against a bona fide purchaser. This is not 
applicable because Spence admittedly received notice of the sale. As such, the non-judicial 
foreclosure sales should not be set aside and rescheduled. 
2. Spencer is Not Entitled to Any Alleged Surplus. 
a. Facts 
The foreclosure sales were done in reverse chronological order. The foreclosure sale 
pursuant to the Second Deed of Trust (Parcel 3) occurred fust at 10:OO am. on February 24, 
2005. Spencer did attend this sale. Davidson Trust submitted a credit bid of the then 
remaining balance owed, $86,507.45, and was awarded a Trustee's Deed. 
The foreclosure sale pursuant to the First Deed of Trust (Parcels 1, 2 & 3) occurred a 
short time later at 10:30 a.m. Spencer attend this sale and bid $10.00. Davidson Trust 
submitted a credit bid of the then remaining balance owed under the First and Second Deeds of 
Trust, $204,074.37. Davidson Trust was the high bidder and was given a Trustee's Deed to the 
Real Property. The Trustee's Deeds for both sales were recorded an hour later. 
b. Credit Bids. 
There is no question that Idaho law allows for the use of credit bids in foreclosure sales. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
The principle articulated in the above-cited cases is compatible with LC. 3 45-1506 and, 
indeed, it makes a good deal of practical sense. There is no reason why the holder of the 
deed of trust note should not be able to purchase the property at a trustee sale by bidding 
in all or part of the amount owing pursuant to the note. After all, the holder of the note is 
the party to be benefited by the sale. It makes no sense to require the note holder to bring 
cash to the sale in order to pay himself. His bid, if successful, immediately reduces or 
eliminates the debtor's obligation. We hold where the holder of the deed of trust note is 
the bidder, crediting the bid against the note is the equivalent of a cash sale. The district 
court properly held that the credit bid here complied with the statutory requirements. 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Aupel, 143 Idaho 42, 45, 137 P.3d 429, 432 
(2006). 
The question then becomes whether Davidson Trust could combine the amounts due 
under both Deed of Trusts as a credit bid at the second sale. Idaho law allows for the 
combination of bids at a foreclosure sale: 
Where the holder of a special lien is compelled to satisfy a prior lien for his own 
protection, he may enforce payment of the amount so paid by him, as part of the claim for 
which his own lien exists. 
Idaho Code 5 45-105. 
In Thomvson v. Kirsch, 106 Idaho 177,181-82,677 P.2d 490 (1984), the Idaho Supreme 
Court expanded on the issue of combining foreclosure bids: 
Idaho Code § 45-903 provides: "The lien of a mortgage is special, unless otherwise 
expressly agreed, and is independent of possession." Since the second deed of trust held 
by the Thompsons was functionally equivalent to a mortgage, we hold that the 
Thompsons' lien was special. Accordingly, LC. 5 45-105 entitled them to include 
payments they made to prevent foreclosure of the first deed of trust as part of the 
mortgage indebtedness created by their junior encumbrance. See also Miller v. Stavros, 
174 So. 2d 48,49 (Fla. Di. Ct. App. 1965) (holdmg that "amounts paid by the holder of 
a second mortgage to protect his security are properly included in a decree foreclosing the 
second mortgage"). Moreover, the deed of trust signed by Mr. Kirsch specifically 
required him, as one of the grantors, to pay when due "all Lprior] encumbrances, charges 
and liens, with interest." It authorized the Thompsons to make such payments when 
deemed necessary to protect the security of the second deed of trust. Finally, it gave the 
Thompsons the right to recover such advances %om the grantors "with interest from the 
date of expenditure at eight percent per annum." 
Thomvson, 106 Idaho at 181-82. 
Admittedly, this is not a case of a junior lienor paying off a senior lien. But, the analogy 
is still applicable because this case presents the unique circumstance where the holder of the two 
most senior lien positions on the Real Property i s  the same entity. When a junior lienor pays off 
the senior lien, the junior lienor then puts themselves in the situation of having the two most 
senior liens. This is functionally equivalent to what was done in this case. 
Immediitely prior to the first sale, Davidson Trust was owed a combined $204,074.37 
from Spencer. At the first sale, Davidson Trust bid $86,507.45, the amount owed under the 
second note. At the second sale, Davidson Trust needed to protect its rights by bidding not only 
the $1 17,566.92 held by Davidson Trust as the senior lienholder, but also the $86,507.45, the 
"part of the lien for which his own lien exists." See Idaho Code 5 45-105. 
An argument could also be made that the Second Deed of Trust and the subsequent sale 
were superfluous. The First Deed of Trust specifically states that it is entered into "to secure 
payment of all such fixther sums as may hereafter be loaned or advanced by the Beneficiary 
herein to the Grantor herein, or any or either of them, while record owner of present interest, for 
any purposes, and of any notes, drafts or other investments representing such further loans, 
advances or expenditures together with interest on all such sums as at the rate therein provided." 
(R, p. 14). This language, in and of itself, allows Davidson Trust to bid the full $204,074.37 at 
the second sale. 
Spencer argues that allowing a combination of credit bids would give a note holder a 
virtual blank check to bid at the foreclosure sales and would have a chilling effect on the ability 
for others to bid. (See Spencer's Brief on Appeal, p. 25-26). However, Davidson Trust is not 
arguing that it can just pick any number out of the air and submit it as its own bid. Davidson 
Trust was owed $204,074.37 prior to the fust sale. How much did Davidson Trust bid at the 
@ 
second sale? $204.07437. This does b have a chilling effect on others ability to bid. If Spencer 
I 
had bid $204.074.38, he would have held title to all three parcels and Davidson Trust would have 
received all of its money back. Everyone benefits under this scenario. 
c. Distribution. 
Further, it makes practical sense to allow the combination of credit bids when the two 
most senior lienholders are the same entity because of the distribution statutes. The Idaho Code 
states: 
The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale as follows: 
(1) To the expenses of the sale, including a reasonable charge by the trustee and a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
(2) To the obligation secured by the trust deed. 
(3) To any persons having recorded liens subsequent to the interest of the trustee in the 
trust deed as their interests may appear. 
(4) The surplus, if any, to the grantor of the trust deed or to his successor in interest 
entitled to such surplus. 
Idaho Code 5 45-1 507. 
In this case, Davidson Trust bid $204,074.37 at the second sale. The Trustee would 
apply these proceeds first to the expenses of the sale and the amount owed under the First Deed 
of Trust ($1 17,566.92). The remaining balance ($86,507.45) would be applied to the next lien in 
line. There is no dispute that the Trustee's Deed issued after the first sale was not recorded until 
11:30 a.m. As such, the Second Deed of Trust was still a lien and senior to all other liens. After 
this distribution of $86,507.45, there is no surplus to distribute to Spencer or any other third 
Spencer's Amended Complaint also alleges, incorrectly, that he is entitled to the surplus 
proceeds. (R, pp. 35-37). But, Michael Thompson was the holder of a junior deed of trust on 
Parcels 1 & 3. (AR, p. 124). Thompson subordinated his interest in favor of both the First Deed 
of Trust and the Second Deed of Trust. (AR, p. 135-138). Both subordination agreements have 
nearly identical language: 
WHEREAS, it is a condition precedent to obtaining said loan that said deed of trust last 
above-mentioned shall unconditionally be and re&in at all times a lien or charge upon 
the land hereinbefore described, prior and suoerior to the lien or charge of the deed of 
trust first above-mentioned: 
(I) That said deed of trust securing said note in favor of Lender, and any renewals or 
extensions thereof, shall unconditionally be and remain at all times a lien or charge on 
the property therein described, prior and suoerior to the lien or charge of the deed of 
t m t  first above-mentioned. 
(Id.) (Emphasis added). 
These subordination agreements show two ihings. First, the Second Deed of Trust had 
priority over Thompson's deed of trust even though the sale had been completed. The Second 
Deed of Trust was unconditionaUy, at all times, a prior and superior lien to Thompson's lien. 
In addition, this also shows that Spencer would be entitled to any surplus under the 
distribution statutes. Thompson would be ahead of Spencer if, hypothetically, there was any 
surplus money to distribute. Therefore, Spencer has failed to state a claim for which relief can 
be &ranted. (R., p. 49). 
d. Equity 
There would be an inequitable result assuming Davidson Trust was only allowed to bid 
$117,566.92 at the second sale. If Spencer (or any third party for that matter) bid even one 
penny more than Davidson Trust, Spencer would be given title to the three parcels and Davidson 
Trust would have received $1 17,566.92. 
But, the central question the court needs to ask itself: What happened to the $86,507.45 
Davidson Trust loaned pursuant to DOT 2? 
The IRAISEP account cannot pursue a deficiency balance because DOT 2 has been 
foreclosed. As such, Spencer walks away from a total indebtedness of $204,074.37, after paying 
only $1 17,566.92. He defaults on two separate promissory notes and has the ability to walk 
away from the $86,507.45 without paying a d i e .  Quite simply, the IWSEP account had no 
choice but to bid $204,074.37 at the second sale in order to protect its security. If it did not bid 
this amount and was outbid by Spencer, or any other third party, it would lose $86,507.45. This 
would be an unjust result for the Respondents. 
The same inequities would apply if the Court declared, as requested by Spencer, that 
$290,581.82. Spencer is asking the Court for Davidson Trust to pay him $86,507.45 after he 
defaulted on not one, but two different promissory notes. 
e. Persona1 Property. 
The character of the mobile home as real property or personal property has no bearing on 
this case. The non-judicial foreclosure sales complied with all aspects of LC. 9 45-1502, et seq. 
Spencer was loaned $90,000.00 under the First Deed of Trust. As collateral, he voluntarily 
signed the First Deed of Trust, which included a reference to his mobile home. (See R., pp.14- 
15). Spencer defaulted on the underlying note and the Successor Trustee began non-judicial 
foreclosure proceedings. The Successor Trustee foreclosed on the four corners of the Deeds of 
Trust. Spencer received all notices to which he was entitled and he even appeared at the second 
sale. The fact that there was a reference to a mobile home does not invalidate the proper 
procedures taken pursuant to the foreclosure statutes. Moreover, any damages he allegedly 
sustained would be against the Successor Trustee who has never appeared in this action. 
f. $5,000.00 
In connection with the Second Deed of Trnst the parties entered into a Loan Commitment 
Agreement whereby Davidson Trust held back the sum of $42,500.00 and would disperse the 
funds to Spencer upon seven enumerated items related to improvement of the secured property. 
There is no dispute that Spencer completed items (a) through (0 on the Loan Commitment 
Agreement and was paid $37,500.00. 
Spencer is also not disputing the fact that he did g@ complete item "(g): Mobile remodel 
costs, including windows, carpets, drywall, etc. (to be paid upon completion)." He did not 
complete the condition of the contract, so $5,000.00 was not dispersed to him. 
But, the issue of the $5,000.00 is a red herring and does not create a genuine issue of 
material fact for two reasons. First, this money is still charged to the account of Spencer because 
its intended use was to improve the secured property. It was not the properly of Davidson Trust. 
It was held in trust until Spencer completed the item (g). If Spencer had, at any time, provided 
Davidson Trnst with sufficient evidence that he completed item (g), he would have received his 
$5,000.00. But, he admits he never did this. DOT 2 specifically allows Davidson Trust to make 
any advances necessary to protect the security interest and charge the account of Spencer. 
Spencer failed to perform his duty under the contract and Davidson Trust was required to 
remodekepair the mobile home and expended the $5,000.00 in doing so. This situation is no 
different than Spencer agreeing to pay all property taxes when due. He did not pay the property 
taxes and they were charged to his account. 
Perhaps more importantly, Spencer would not even be entitled to the $5,000.00 if it had 
created a surplus. An individual by the name of Mike Thompson held a junior lien in the 
Property. Mr. Thompson unconditionally subordinated his interest in the Property to both Deeds 
of T m t  held by Davidson Trust. If the $5,000.00 created a surplus, it would have gone to Mr. 
Thompson, not Spencer. Mr. Thompson is not a party to the present action. As argued before 
the lower court, it is doubtfid Spencer was even a real party in interest to begin the proceedings. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There are no genuine issues of material fact and the Respondents were properly granted a 
judgment as a matter of law. The non-judicial foreclosure sales terminate all of Spencer's 
interest in the Real Property because Spencer admits he receive all notices to which he was 
entitled. As such, the non-judicial foreclosure sales are final and should not be rescheduled. In 
addition, Spencer is not entitled to any alleged surplus from the non-judicial foreclosure sales. 
Davidson Trust properly submitted a credit bid for the amounts owed under both the First Deed 
of Trust and Second Deed of Trust. As such, there was no surplus to distribute. Even if there 
was an alleged surplus, there was at least one other person, not a party to the present action, who 
had priority over Spencer. As such, Spencer fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. It is therefore respectfully requested that the Court affirm the decision of the lower 
court. 
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